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 Abstract 
Codecision is the main EU legislative procedure and the 2007 Reform Treaty draft has adopted it to 
improve the budgetary process. However, at close examination, codecision and the current 
budgetary process show an identical structure. Both are designed as non-cooperative alternating 
offers bargaining games between institutions and both, although in different measure, have gone 
through periods of interinstitutional deadlocks and conflicts, which can be ascribed to the 
insufficiency of the non-cooperative bargaining setup with respect to the task of  providing for joint-
decision making by the Parliament and the Council of Ministers: in particular, the opportunistic 
interpretation of the Treaty provisions by the Parliament in the 1980s  was one of the consequences 
of the strict bargaining design. The lacking elements for joint decision-making have been gradually 
inserted in the procedures by means of informal negotiation institutions, which are not only  
mechanisms for equilibrium selection but also corrective devices to strict non-cooperative 
procedures. In the change from the current budgetary procedure to the one designed in the Reform 
Treaty, the Parliament does not seem to gain a formal ‘dominant position’, whereas the 
Commission improves its scope for action and the Council consolidates its role.  
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) finances have been much criticized by the political economy 
literature. They are considered an inappropriate tool for fostering common goals (Micossi and Gros, 
2006; Buti and Nava, 2003), unable to expand the provision of public goods in new areas of 
integration, such as internal and external security or foreign policy (Tabellini, 2003). The 
accompanying decision-making procedures have equally been subject to criticism, as they are too 
long and complicated and as they have been repeatedly the occasion for serious interinstitutional 
conflicts between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.  
The recent institutional reform wave in the EU (2002-2007) has redesigned part of the 
current procedural framework for the EU finances. In particular, in the 2004 and 2007 Treaty drafts 
the budgetary procedure has been reformed along the lines of legislative codecision. This paper 
aims at analyzing the changes in the assignment of institutional powers, strategies and competences 
implied in the new procedure and their possible effects for the development of interinstitutional 
relationships in the budgetary field.  
The analysis discusses first the formal design of the current budgetary procedure, whose 
importance is often neglected. As a matter of fact, it represented the first real involvement of the 
Parliament in the EU decision-making processes and it traced a path for the development of 
interinstitutional relationships in other decision-making processes, codecision included. The paper 
aims, in particular, at a reconstruction of the link between the formal design of the procedure and 
the difficulties of its operational functioning, which finally required formal changes of the rules and 
the enactment of informal institutions.  
With the budgetary procedure the Parliament was first given an effective role in the EU 
decision-making. The design of the budgetary procedure preceded both the decision to elect the 
Parliament’s members by universal direct voting in 1976 and the upgrading of its legislative power, 
which started with the Single European Act and the cooperation procedure in 1987. However, when 
put into practice, the budgetary procedure produced many interinstitutional difficulties and periods 
of prolonged conflicts. The literature1 ascribes them to a host of factors: the Parliament’s and 
Council’s preferences for integration, their degree of impatience, the absence of formal rules for 
solving conflicts, the indeterminacy of some Treaty provisions. To these reasons we add and discuss 
the fact that the procedure was designed as a non-cooperative alternating offers bargaining, which 
proved too rigid to allow for political solutions and thus inefficient with respect to the task of 
providing for joint-decision making by the Council and the Parliament.   
                                                          
1 Interinstitutional relationships in the budgetary field have been investigated, among other, by Laffan (2000), Lindner 
(2006), Régnier-Heldmaier (1994).  
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In particular, the paper  complements Lindner’s (2006) analysis of the opportunistic 
strategies of the Parliament in the 1980s. Alternating offers between institutions requires that each 
institution finds an internal political agreement, which can be more or less difficult to obtain 
depending on many factors (preferences, coalitions, voting rules), and that it accepts to redraft it at 
any stage of the procedure. As it is difficult and burdensome to change the internal agreement, each 
institution tends to stick to its initial position: the particular procedure chosen for the budget 
exasperates this tendency and makes dominant those strategies insisting on each actor’s preferred 
allocation. It is because of this setting, that the most constrained authority, the Parliament, resorted 
in the 1980s to the opportunistic exploitation of those provisions or ambiguities in the Treaty that 
could enlarge its competences, i.e. the indeterminacy concerning the list of non-compulsory 
expenditures and the calculus of the Maximum Rate of Increase.  
The solutions to the shortcomings in the procedural design were found in a formal change of 
rules (the institution of the Financial Perspectives and of the Interinstitutional Agreement) and in the 
gradual development of a set of informal institutions, including best practices for negotiations and 
informal occasions for political bargaining. Thus, informal institutions have been not only a 
mechanism for equilibrium selection, as in Farrell and Héritier (2003), but also a corrective device 
to the institutional setting of strict non-cooperative bargaining. However, although they remedy to 
procedural difficulties, informal institutions are also a channel to accommodate pressures for major 
changes: at the same time, they grant procedural stability and prevent those far-reaching reforms 
that the institutional design would require. 
Non-cooperative bargaining between the Parliament and the Council is also the backbone of 
codecision, the legislative procedure. Again, shaping intergovernmental relationships by means of 
an infinite-horizon alternating offers bargaining implied interinstitutional difficulties and the need to 
develop informal institutions: the former experience with the budgetary procedure and the 
interinstitutional contacts so far developed then helped the Council to accept the political role of the 
Parliament and improved the operational working of codecision. 
In the 2007 Treaty a modified version of codecision substitutes for the current budgetary 
procedure. We argue that this does not represent a substantial innovation, as codecision shares with 
the current budgetary procedure the same design of an alternating offers bargaining game between 
institutions. The limits of this procedural design are recognized by the Reform Treaty, which 
institutionalizes the role of informal institutions and reinforces the Commission’s role as a mediator. 
Informal institutions will be called to intensively assist the working of the new budgetary procedure, 
also because budgetary codecision is shorter than the legislative process and there are fewer 
possibilities for amendments. This will make essential, in advance of the first reading, to clearly 
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state the political priorities of each institution and to reinforce the mechanisms of informal dialogue 
at an early stage. 
Comparing the current and the reformed procedures, we also find that there are some 
changes in the interinstitutional balance of power. In particular, more scope for action is given to the 
Commission; opting-out is possible for both the Council and the Parliament in Conciliation, but it is 
easier for the Council; the enlargement of the competences for both the Council and the Parliament 
formalises what is currently their political say in informal negotiations and, on balance, seems to 
favour the Council. We are sceptical of the Parliament’s enthusiasm for the provision that assigns it 
the possibility to disregard the joint text rejection by the Council and to reinstate its previous 
amendments after conciliation: it does not sanction the “Parliament’s dominant position” in the 
budget (European Parliament, 2008), but it is simply functional to guarantee that the text approved 
in conciliation by the delegates of the Parliament and Council is not repudiated by their parent 
bodies.  
In the analysis we try to combine an interpretation of the formal decision-making rules and 
of their de facto operation and we try to investigate how institutions have responded to the formal 
rules imposed on them. For this purpose we start with a formal analysis of the Treaty rules and try to 
analyse which elements in their design have been responsible for the operative choices of the 
institutions. In this sense we adopt for the budgetary issues, the intermediate approach that Burns, 
(2003), Rasmussen (2003) and Rittberger (2000) have employed for interpreting legislative 
codecision, combining the analysis of the strategic interactions among actors and elements of the de 
facto interinstitutional practice. 
 The analysis begins by briefly sketching the evolution of the budgetary procedure (section 
2) and the budgetary conflicts of the 1980s (section 2.1). Section 3 provides a description of the 
formal rules for deciding the budget and of the de facto working of the procedure. The solutions to 
the budgetary conflicts are discussed in section 4. The formal rules that govern legislative 
codecision are presented in section 5. The final part summarises the novelties for the EU finances 
introduced by the 2007 Reform Treaty (section 6) and presents some conclusions (section 7). 
 
2. The common pool problem and its solution in the EC Treaty  
The political economy literature has much stressed the role of institutions in dealing with the 
common pool resource problem which affects fiscal and budgetary issues: deficit bias, 
overspending, lack of transparency. The response provided by the literature (Alesina and Perotti 
2004; von Hagen et al. 2002) suggests the introduction of strong institutionalised constraints or a 
strong minister for finance, who represents the interests of all taxpayers and ensures that the budget 
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reflects the true cost to the public. Both aspects contribute to better governance of the budget and to 
higher centralization of the decision-making process, which seems to be correlated with better 
budgetary outcomes (von Hagen 1992; Alesina et al. 1999). 
In the EU budgetary politics, the first issue to solve is which institutional level 
(intergovernmental or supranational) is entrusted of the common pool problem and in which degree. 
The second issue concerns the consequences of the common pool problem, which are different from 
those related to the national budgets. In the EU, the common pool problem can not produce a deficit 
bias, as the Treaty prescribes that the budget must always be in balance and revenues automatically 
adapt to the level of the expenditures. However, the commons encourage overspending demands 
both from the member States, trying to minimise their net payments, i.e. to increase those items of 
expenditure from which they benefit more, while keeping their share of financing as small as 
possible, and from the European Parliament, enjoying the unique position of gaining credit from 
budgetary expansions, while not being associated to the related costs (Enderlein and Lindner 2006). 
In this contribution we focus on the first issue, while we do not touch the allocation issue, which has 
been extensively analysed in the literature (Baldwin, 2005; Baldwin et al., 1997; Blankart and 
Koester, 2008; Kauppi and Widgrén, 2005; Nava, 2000; Strasser, 1991). 
The Treaty of Rome initially entrusted the budgetary problems only to the intergovernmental 
level of cooperation. All decision-making power over the annual budget was bestowed on the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament’s role was limited to consultation (ex art. 203 
TEC). This first budgetary procedure was different from the ordinary consultation procedure, (Art. 
250 TEC) employed for the ordinary legislation: in fact, the preliminary budget draft prepared by 
the Commission was not considered a legislative proposal, but a sui generis act which disappeared 
when the Council adopted the budget draft. Thus the Commission’s right to propose a preliminary 
draft did not correspond to an effective agenda-setting power. The budget was always regularly 
approved during the 1970s, as the request for qualified majority voting in the Council avoided the 
problems that ordinary legislation met because of the application of the Luxembourg compromise 
and of the unanimity rule.  
The Luxembourg Treaty (1970) and the Brussels Treaty (1975) modified the original outline, 
upgrading the power of the Parliament to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Community. 
The access of the Parliament to the common pool problem increased the complexity of the decision-
making process, which only apparently mimics the national budgetary procedures, where a Minister 
for finance prepares the draft budget and two Chambers discuss and amend it. The new set-up (Art. 
272 TEC) provides for a draft budget prepared by the Commission and for two readings by the 
budgetary authorities. However, the role of the Commission cannot be compared to the role of a 
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minister for finance, as, although it assists the whole procedure, has information advantages and 
forwards compromise proposals, its formal institutional role ends with the submission of the 
preliminary draft budget: in principle, the budgetary authorities are not obliged to take the 
Commission’s proposals and advices into account and can radically change them. It is true that the 
Commission’s influence did not end with the formal assignment of strategic roles. However, right 
because of its institutional limits, the Commission, although engaged in reconciling the parties, was 
unable to prevent the emergence and escalation of interinstitutional budgetary conflicts in the 1980s.  
The Treaty states that budgetary decisions must be adopted after the competent authorities 
have debated them and have tried to reach an agreement. In case of divergent positions, the Treaty  
divides the budgetary powers by establishing a complex system of different competences on the 
expenditures. The Council is given competence on the compulsory expenditures, those “necessarily 
resulting from the Treaties or from acts adopted in accordance therewith” (art. 272 TEC), i.e. those 
related to policy areas where decisions are kept at intergovernmental level. The Parliament can 
modify, by absolute majority of votes, the initial proposals on compulsory expenditures made by the 
Council. Modifications that increase the total expenditures must be approved by a qualified majority 
of the Council otherwise they decay; modifications that do not increase the expenditures can be 
refused by a qualified majority of the Council, otherwise they are approved. Therefore, if the 
Parliament gains a blocking minority (qualified majority) in the Council, it can obtain a reduction 
(increase) in compulsory expenditures.  
The Parliament is given competence on the non-compulsory expenditures, which represented 
only five percent of the total budget in the early 1970s. The Parliament can amend (by majority of 
members) the initial proposal of the Council on non-compulsory expenditures. These amendments 
are automatically accepted, unless a qualified majority in the Council rejects or modifies them. To 
avoid overspending by the Parliament, the annual increase in the non-compulsory expenditures was 
limited by a Maximum Rate of Increase, a statistical indicator ascertained by the Commission. A 
higher Maximum Rate of Increase can be decided by the Council and the Parliament when required 
by the EU activities. The Brussels Treaty further expanded the power of the Parliament by granting 
it a ‘margin for manoeuvre’, i.e. a sum (equal to half of the Maximum Rate of Increase) on whose 
destination the Parliament can freely decide and which it can use to increase the non-compulsory 
expenditures or to create new lines of expenditure. 
The distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditures in art. 272 TEC is 
vague: the effective sharing of competences is made by means of political agreements between the 
budgetary authorities. A further element of ambiguity can be traced to the fact that the sharing of 
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budgetary powers does not coincide with the sharing of legislative powers: the Parliament is thus 
given the final say on expenditures whose execution depends on juridical acts taken by the Council2.  
 
 2.1 The EU budgetary conflicts: 1979-1987 
When first implemented, the budgetary procedure went first through a period of frail 
budgetary equilibrium, due to the Council’s care not to explicitly deny the Parliament’s decision-
making power and to the Parliament’s acceptance of a sort of tutelage from the Council itself3 
(Bangemann, 1979). When this acceptance failed, a prolonged period of interinstitutional difficulty 
began (1979-1987):  “the inability of Parliament and Council to agree upon a joint budget started to 
become a norm” (Lindner, 2006, p. 58). The Parliament increasingly perceived the investiture of the 
budgetary powers as a decisive moment in its existence and asserted them in all possible ways. It 
interpreted the Treaty provisions in the sense of an investiture of political power concerning the 
employment of the Community’s resources: “Parliament saw itself as the conscience of the 
European Community on budgetary matters” (Wallace, 1987). The Council, on the other hand, 
sought to restrain the role of the Parliament and to maintain control over the entire process: it 
minimised the political character of the budget, stating that budgetary decisions were simply the 
financial translation of legislative decisions. As Lindner (2006) describes it: 
“The annual decision-making was the key forum for interinstitutional interaction between the 
Parliament and the Council; its importance transcended the realm of budgetary politics. For the Parliament 
it was the only arena in which it could demonstrate its impact on European decision-making… [In the 
Parliament], the Committee on Budget used the unity on institutional issues strategically. In painting the 
picture of a common enemy, the Committee presented most budgetary disputes with the Council as 
institutional conflicts over the role of the Parliament in EC politics. Budget experts portrayed the dispute 
over classification of the regional funds as a defence of the rights of the Parliament“ (Lindner 2006, pp. 
50-51).  
The literature (Laffan, 1997; Lindner, 2006) ascribes the conflicts between the Parliament 
and the Council to a number of reasons: 
i. the reluctance of the Council to a real sharing of decision-making power, the 
substantial autonomy of the Parliament with respect to the member States and its desire to 
consolidate its institutional role;  
                                                          
2 The Council always insisted on the superiority of legislative acts: “prerequisite of any budgetary act was, in the eyes of 
the Council, the existence of a legislative decision that introduced a legal base for the expenditure decision” (Lindner 
2006, p.49). 
3 “[The Parliament tolerated that ], by exaggeratedly reducing the appropriations proposed by the Commission in its 
preliminary draft budget, the Council could pre-determine in a large measure [its own] decisions.[….] [Besides, the 
Parliament tolerated that the Council practically exerted a veto power on the expenditures execution” (Bangemann, 
1979, p.174 -own translation). 
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ii. the absence of formal rules in the Treaty to solve disputes between the budgetary 
authorities; 
iii. the indeterminacy of some provisions in the Treaty, especially the scope for different 
interpretations in the definition of non-compulsory expenditures and in the calculus of the 
Maximum Rate of Increase. The possibility to resort to opportunistic interpretations hinges on 
some conditions: the Commission supports the Parliament, the European Court of Justice fails 
to limit the Parliament’s interpretations; a gap exists between the own resources limit and the 
Maximum Rate of Increase, which opens a space for a higher budget (Lindner 2006); 
iv. the different time horizons, a longer one for the Parliament and a shorter one for the 
Council, which is constrained by its six-months-long Presidencies (Farrell and Héritier 2003; 
Lindner 2006). The Parliament is thus more prepared to delay the budget than the Council; 
v. the different preferences of the actors. The Parliament is more pro-integrationist, 
favours larger budgets and is also more interested in institutional building; 
vi. a different sensitivity to failure (i.e. to budget rejection), lower for the Parliament, 
whose members face less pressure from the electorate and their national governments than the 
representatives of the member States in the Council (Pollack, 1997; Farrell and Héritier 2003).  
 
Some of these elements should not per se provide for reasons of conflict. Incompleteness in 
the rules specification is often unavoidable and it is usually corrected ex post when the procedure is 
applied: this is especially true with texts, such as the EU Treaties, that use relatively broad language 
(Farrell and Héritier 2003). However, in the case of the EU budgetary procedure this indeterminacy 
was exploited by the Parliament, that adopted opportunistic interpretations of the treaty provisions 
on the expenditure classification and the Maximum Rate of Increase. The Parliament thus aimed at 
strengthening its power and at influencing the legislative domain from which it was excluded until 
1987 (Laffan 1997).  
Table 1 resumes the main causes for the budgetary conflicts, showing that all annual budget 
presented between 1979 and 1987 were either rejected by the Parliament or approved by it and then 
contested by the Council: the only exceptions were the 1983 and 1984 budgets, when the Council, 
although unsatisfied with the Parliament’s decisions, settled on a compromise with it4.  
 
 
                                                          
4 In the 1983 budget the Parliament adopted an opportunistic interpretation over expenditure classification and the 
Council accommodated this move by increasing the Maximum Rate of Increase. In the 1984 budget, the Parliament 
classified the compensation appropriations to Germany and UK as non-compulsory expenditure and blocked them 
asking for a solution to the Community financing system. The Council protested against this move but did not take the 
Parliament to the Court of Justice. In March 1984 the Council found a compromise on compensations and accepted the 
Parliament’s interpretations.  
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Table 1 - The causes of the budgetary conflicts: budgets for the years 1980-1988 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget 
(year) 
Final decision on the draft budget 
Reasons of dispute 
 
Opportunistic interpretation of 
Treaty provisions by EP 
Other reasons 
EP approves  
After budget 
approval 
CM takes 
action against 
EP before ECJ  
EP rejects 
budget  
Increase in 
MRI/NCE- 
Definition of 
margin of 
manoeuvre 
Expenditure 
classification 
1980 
  √  √ 
Dispute on 
agricultural 
expenditure 
1981 √ √  √   
1982 √ √ Supplementary Budget*  √ 
 
1983 √    √  
1984 √    √  
1985 
  √   
Institutional 
defect: CM 
presented a 10-
month budget 
1986 
√ √    
Insufficient 
resources for new 
accessions 
1987   √ √ √  
1988 
  
No proper 
procedure. EP 
took action 
against CM 
before the ECJ 
  
CM disagreed on 
own resources 
ceiling and 
delayed first 
reading.  
 
Sources : Laffan (1997); Strasser (1991); Lindner (2006). 
Legenda. MRI/NCE: Maximum Rate of Increase. NCE: Non-compulsory expenditures. EP : European Parliament, CM : 
Council of Minister ; ECJ: European Court of Justice. 
* Supplementary budgets are submitted by the Commission in the event of unavoidable and exceptional circumstances. 
They increase the volume of expenditure in the initial budget or provide for new expenditures.  
 
 
Lindner (2006) shows how the Parliament’s recourse to an opportunist interpretation of the 
Treaty improved its payoffs in the strategic one-shot game with the Council, modelled as a Battle of 
Sexes. We complement this interpretation, arguing that the particular decision-making procedure 
chosen by the Treaty is to be added to the reasons explaining the Parliament’s opportunism and the 
escalation of interinstitutional conflicts. 
 
3. The procedure design as a reason for interinstitutional conflict  
The budgetary procedure is designed in the Treaty as a non-cooperative alternating-offers 
bargaining game (Figure 1).  
 
 
  11
Figure 1.  An extensive game form of the budgetary procedure (art. 272 EC Treaty) 
 
         COMMISSION:  X0 
 
   
              CM: X1  =    XCE 1  +  XNCE 1           
           QMV 
 
                                                           
          Yes   EP         No     
 
                                                                                                                         
                                                                 
                                           Budget adopted: X1       XCE 2           +              XNCE 2  
       M votes                M members    
  
             
  Decision on compulsory                  Decision on non-compulsory 
  expenditures        expenditures 
 
             
                                                                           CM (QMV)      
      EP’s amendments increase 
                       total expenditures ?                      Yes            No 
                                                                                                                                                               
                                     Yes                                          No                                                                        
        XNCE 2   XNCE 3 
           CM                        CM                                                        
          
 Yes (QMV)               No               Yes          No (QMV)    EP    
                                             
            
            XCE 2          XCE 1  XCE 2             XCE 1          Yes                       No 
             
               XNCE 3      XNCE 2 
                                  M members 
             3/5 votes
                           
              
             XCE 2  and  XNCE 2    
        
               XCE 2  and  XNCE 3  
  Possible results if    
  budget approved         
 
         Most probable outcomes                     
             XCE 1  and  XNCE 3  
           
        
        
Legenda. CM: Council of Ministers; EP: European Parliament; Xi : total appropriations proposed at stage i. XNCE i : 
appropriations for non compulsory expenditures proposed at stage i. XCE i  : appropriations for compulsory expenditures 
proposed at stage i. 
Voting rules: QMV, qualified majority voting; M, majority; AM, absolute majority. 
 
 
 
 
The Commission has responsibility for preparing a preliminary draft budget, which is 
submitted to both authorities for a first reading. The Budget Council establishes at qualified 
XCE 1  and  XNCE 2
Opting out  New draft: X4 
AM members and 2/3 votes 
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majority voting the draft budget, after the Budget Committee and the Coreper have discussed and 
voted it. The draft budget is then examined by the Parliament’s Budget Committee, which votes the 
amendments/ modifications put forward by the sectoral committees and prepares a comprehensive 
response to the budget, which is then voted en bloc in the Parliament’s plenary session.  
The Parliament’s decision is transmitted to the Council for a second reading, where it 
accepts or rejects the Parliament’s proposals: if the Council fails to raise a qualified majority to 
reject Parliament’s amendments to compulsory expenditures that do not increase total expenditures, 
the Parliament’s position (XCE2) will be adopted. Although this result is theoretically possible, it may 
be difficult to obtain, because of the intergovernmental practices of compromise5, which are at work 
since the first reading and which consolidate the Council’s initial agreement on the budget draft. 
Thus, if, as it is highly foreseeable, the Council raises a qualified majority to reject the Parliament’s 
amendments, the budget will include the Council’s position on compulsory expenditures (XCE1). The 
Council decides also on the Parliament’s amendments on non-compulsory expenditures and to 
constraint them it usually invokes o questions the application of the Maximum Rate of Increase.  
The Council’s decision is sent back to the Parliament for a final reading: the Parliament can 
restore its position (by absolute majority of members and 3/5 of votes) where it has authority and 
approves the budget. “If there are important reasons” (art. 272(8) TEC), the Parliament can also 
reject the budget by absolute majority of members and 2/3 of votes: this is a political act, after 
which the Commission enacts the system of provisional twelfths, where spending is limited per 
month to the one-twelfth of the previous year’s budget. A qualified majority of the Council can 
modify the system of provisional twelfths, while the Parliament (by majority of members and 3/5 of 
votes) retains power on modifications touching the non-compulsory expenditures (art. 273 TEC). 
The presence of institutional actors modifies the traditional bargaining among individuals in 
the following ways: 
i. The Parliament and the Council are obliged to act according to the procedures and to 
start them when the Commission presents a preliminary draft. One actor’s inaction is punished 
by the approval of the draft in the version it has refused to decide on. Moreover, if the Council 
delays the vote on the budget in its first reading beyond October 5th, the Parliament and the 
Commission can appeal to the Court of Justice. 
                                                          
5 It has been difficult for the Parliament to work out alliances with Member States in the Council on spending priorities. 
In the procedure for the 1987 budget, the first after the Iberian accession, the Council had difficulties in approving the 
draft budget (1st reading), because of the blocking minority of the Southern countries, which demanded an increase in 
non-compulsory expenditure. Intergovernmental compromise found a solution by creating a reserve for unforeseeable 
events related to the Southern enlargement and by granting financing to the Integrated Med Programme: this broke the 
minority coalition and the draft budget was approved. When the Parliament (1st reading) proposed significant increases 
in non-compulsory expenditures, it did not managed to raise a minority blocking in the Council to prevent the rejections 
of its amendments. The Council accepted amendments only up the Maximum Rate of Increase. 
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ii. The formal structure of the procedure in the Treaty provides neither for pre-play 
communication, not for focal arbitrators. In neither case, the role of the Commission amounts 
to more than drafting the preliminary proposal and facilitating the discussions. This 
institutional disadvantage does not make it irrelevant, however it limits its room for 
manoeuvre and the possibility to influence the final outcome. 
iii. The negotiated agreement is enforceable and, as such, it is protected against the 
players’ reneging on their decisions.  
iv. The budgetary decisions are taken in a setting of repeated interaction between the 
Parliament and the Council. 
 
We simplify the analysis assuming that EU institutions act strategically as unitary actors6, 
that the Parliament aims at increasing its role in the decision-making process and that the Council is 
mainly oriented towards maintaining the existing levels and distribution of the expenditure. We skip 
the details of decision-making inside each institution: however, we are well aware that the greater 
are the difficulties of reaching an internal agreement on a draft, the greater will be the difficulties of 
modifying this position in the development of the procedure. This hysteresis effect creates a rigidity 
in the alternating offers setup: it is far more difficult for institutions than for individuals to alternate 
offers, because institutions must internally renegotiate their positions and this can be politically 
complicated or impossible. Therefore, institutions tend to stick to their first offer.  
Figure 1 sketches the extensive game form of the budgetary procedure7, which is 
compounded by two alternating offers bargaining games: a 3-stages game for the compulsory 
expenditures and a 4-stages game for the non-compulsory expenditures. We can assume that the 
players’ preferred positions are their first offers: xCE1and xNCE1 for the Council and xCE2 and xNCE2 
for the Parliament. 
Differently from the ordinary games of this type (Ståhl, 1972), in both cases at stage n the 
last player’s refusal to accept the (n-1) offer does not entail a zero payoff, but the possibility to 
reinstate his own previous (n-2) offer. Thus, if the Council at its second reading does not accept the 
modifications to compulsory expenditures voted by the Parliament, it can reinstate xCE1, the 
proposal voted at its first reading. The only possibility for the Parliament to influence the decision 
of the Council is to make an offer which the Council strictly prefers over its own original proposal: 
                                                          
6 In the case of the budgetary procedure, this is maybe not a too drastic assumption, as the policy issues at stake have 
long been the same. The simplification may represent a potential problem in the case of the other EU decision-making 
procedures, where the standard assumption is that the level of integration is the main variable shaping the preference of 
the institutional actors. Empirical evidence has revealed the importance of other factors, such as the left-right political 
dimension or policy-specific elements. 
7 For simplicity, the distinction between the Parliament’s modifications to the compulsory expenditures that increase the 
budget total expenditure and those that change only its composition are disregarded. 
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the same holds true for the Council. However, strategies insisting on each part’s preferred allocation 
are dominant. In this non-cooperative setting, there is no incentive for either player to offer the 
counterpart more than his own preferred allocation.  
As a matter of fact, the preferred allocation of the Parliament is bounded by the number of 
expenditures classified as non compulsory and by the calculus of the Maximum Rate of Increase: it 
would eagerly accept an higher offer, i.e. more expenditure items classified as non-compulsory or a 
higher Maximum Rate of Increase. However, the Council has no interest to such an offer, as this 
would imply reducing the number of compulsory expenditure items or accepting to increase the 
budget. Knowing that the counterpart has no incentive to offer more than what is granted by its own 
allocation-insistent strategy, each institution will stick to its own preferred position. The resulting 
budget will combine xCE1  and  xNCE2.  
Besides, to ‘amend’ the other part’s proposal is in principle preferable for both the 
Parliament and the Council to retain power over the expenditures assigned to them by the Treaty, 
especially if the issues at stake are important. Items of expenditure which are not amended at the 
first readings, cannot later be modified and, whenever the Council and the Parliament reach an 
agreement over an item, there can be no subsequent change. Inaction on the part of one authority 
implies the approval of the draft budget in the version passed in the counterpart’s previous reading. 
Therefore, when the Council and the Parliament assign importance to an issue and have different 
positions on it, both tend to amend the original draft and each other’s proposals.  
No real opting-out clause is provided to the bargaining. The Parliament has the right to 
finally reject the overall budget (at absolute majority of members and 2/3 of votes) and to ask the 
Commission to provide for a new proposal: this is de fact interpreted as a re-draft of the second 
reading proposals of the Council and is submitted to both institutions for a third reading that the 
Treaty does not regulate. However, this is not a real outside option for the Parliament, because it is 
not a definite commitment of the Parliament to taking no further part in the negotiation. As the 
budget is essential to the EU functioning and to maintain continuity in the services it finances, the 
recourse to the budget rejection only delays its approval and is a sign of the Parliament’s political 
discontent: thus the procedure is extended until the budget is finally adopted. Therefore the 
probability that the offer of the Parliament to the Council may, if rejected, be final, does not 
represent the power of commitment of the Parliament and does not substantially influence its 
relative share in the agreement, as it would be in a standard alternating offers game8. The weakness 
                                                          
8 In alternating-offers games, player i’s power of commitment (Pi) is the probability that any offers he makes may, if 
rejected, be final (Myerson, 1991) Bargainers can be expected to reach an agreement in which their relative shares 
depend crucially on their relative powers of commitment P1/P2. In the EU budgetary procedure the Council is explicitly 
forbidden to opt out: its inaction is sanctioned by the approval of the budget in the Parliament’s preferred version. The 
Parliament can opt out but this does not terminate the bargaining process.  
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of the opting-out strategy in obtaining significant results is shown in Table 2. Except for the 1980 
budget, the Parliament’s rejection of the budget did not grated it a substantially higher actual 
Maximum Rate of Increase with respect to the Commission’s original proposal. 
 
 
Table 2 – Actual and original Maximum Rates of Increase on non-compulsory expenditures  
 
Budget (year) 
Parliament rejects 
draft/supplementary* 
budget  
MRI on NCE as 
calculated by the 
Commission (%) 
Actual MRI on 
NCE (%) 
1980 √ 13,3 32,85 
1981  12,2 24,4 
1982 √ 14,5 14,6 
1983  11,8 27,77 
1984  11,6 16,97 
1985 √ 9.0 9,75 
1986  7,1 20,0 
1987 √ 8,1 8,2 
 
Source: Fugmann (1992) as quoted in Lindner (2006). 
Legenda. MRI/NCE: Maximum Rate of Increase. NCE: Non-compulsory expenditures. 
* Supplementary budgets are submitted by the Commission in the event of unavoidable and exceptional circumstances. 
They increase the volume of expenditures in the initial budget or provide for new expenditures.  
 
 
Finally, the most constrained authority, the Parliament, has an incentive to resort to the 
exploitation of those provisions or ambiguities that can help it enlarge its competences. Therefore, 
as the Parliament’s initial competence was on only five percent of the total budget and knowing that 
the Council had no interest in spontaneously increasing it, the Parliament resorted to exploit the 
Treaty indeterminacy concerning the list of non-compulsory expenditures and the calculus of the 
Maximum Rate of Increase.  
The 1978-87 escalation of the budgetary conflicts has thus its roots in the procedure design, 
that does not provide for space of political negotiation and compromise and that substantially 
confines institutions with opposed preferences to stick to their own preferred solution, thus 
exasperating their mutual opposition. Table 3 provides an example of the allocation-insistent 
strategies of the Parliament and the Council, compounded with the Parliament’s attempt to enlarge 
its exclusive competencies. The case of the 1987 budget shows the limited effectiveness of the 
opting out clause for the Parliament and its resorting to opportunistic interpretations due to the 
absence of any viable alternative other than sticking to its own preferred position.  
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Table 3 – The procedure for the adoption of the 1987 budget 
 
Stages of the 
procedure 
Strategies of the Parliament and  the Council 
 i) as in art. 272 EC Treaty 
 
Commission 
preliminary draft  
 
 
The draft budget presents expenditure increases only for NCE: X0. 
 
1st reading in the 
Council 
The Council is split between a coalition of Southern countries demanding for increases in NCE 
above the MRI and a coalition favouring budget austerity. The Council finally approves a 
budget within the MRI. This is the Council’s first offer: XCE 1  +  XNCE 1        
 
1st reading in the 
Parliament  
The Parliament’s counter-proposal: the Parliament reinstates most of the Commission 
proposals, it expands the classification of NCE and increases the NCE above the MRI  (XNCE 2) 
and it proposes reductions in CE (XCE 2 ). 
 
2nd reading of the 
Council                         
The Council reinstates its first offer: the Council does not accepts the reductions in CE (this is 
the final decision on CE, XCE 1), rejects the new classification of NCE and accepts increases in 
NCE only up to the MRI (XNCE 3). 
. 
 
2nd reading of 
Parliament 
The alternating-offers procedure offers no other viable alternative and  the Parliament resorts 
to  an opportunistic interpretation of the Treaty:  the Parliament approves an increase in the 
expanded NCE which stays within the MRI, as calculated for the new and expanded 
classification of NCE (XNCE 2). This move is aimed at asserting the Parliament’s institutional 
role but prevents the final adoption of the budget, as imposed by the ECJ ruling.   
  
Provisional twelfth 
system 
Search for compromise: the Parliament asks the Council for a slight increase in the MRI. 
 
 ii) not detailed in the Treaty 
 
3rd reading of the 
Council  
The Council approves an increase of 0,049% in the MRI, from 8,1% to 8,149%: X4 
 
 
3rd reading of  
Parliament  
The Parliament accepts the offer and approves the budget: the slight increase in the MRI shows 
the scarce effectiveness of the opting-out clause in granting power to the Parliament: X4 
 
Source: Lindner (2006), Strasser (1991). 
Legenda. MRI/NCE: Maximum Rate of Increase. NCE: Non-compulsory expenditures ; CE: compulsory expenditures : 
ECJ : European Count of Justice. 
 
 
4. Solving the budgetary deadlocks: formal and informal institutional changes 
The exasperated budgetary deadlocks of the 1980s escalated so much that they would have 
required a comprehensive reform of the interinstitutional relationships and a Treaty reform. This 
extremely burdensome solution was avoided by a change of rules, which included the formal 
transfer of the common pool problem to the highest institutional authority, the European Council, 
and the consolidation of the institutional role of the Parliament through the working of informal 
institutions9.  
                                                          
9 A conflict-reducing element was also the association of the Parliament in the legislative process. Until the Parliament 
did not have legislative power, it tried to influence legislative decisions through budgetary decisions and to protect the 
budgetary realm against intrusions from the legislative realm (Laffan 1997; Lindner 2006). 
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In 1988 J.Delors transferred the common pool problem to the highest decision-making 
intergovernmental body, the European Council, which agrees on a medium-term financial 
programming (the Financial Perspectives) and thus sets an overall ceiling on the size of the annual 
budgets over a five/seven years horizon. The Financial Perspectives are decided by the European 
Council on a draft prepared by the Commission, which is modified by the Council’s Presidency 
until consensus among all Member States is reached10. The Financial Perspectives are then included 
in an Interinstitutional Agreement which is jointly approved by the Commission, the Council of 
Ministers and the Parliament.  
The Interinstitutional Agreement is a contractual instrument not mentioned in the Treaties, 
with no specific approval procedure but bargaining among institutions until consensus is reached. 
As a medium-term commitment device in a setting of repeated interactions, it ties the hands of the 
signing institutions and creates important credibility and reputation effects. The Council accepts to 
limit the compulsory expenditures, in particular the agricultural expenditure; the Parliament limits 
itself when voting amendments to the non-compulsory expenditures, which are now no more subject 
to the Maximum Rate of Increase but to the ceilings of the medium-term programming; the 
Commission has reduced scope in preparing the preliminary draft budget.  
The Interinstitutional Agreement strengthens the institutional role of both the Commission 
and the Parliament. The Commission and the Parliament, in particular, are granted a veto in the 
subscription of the Agreement, which is a voluntary non-binding act, whose force relies only on 
political consensus. The Parliament has in fact repeatedly menaced to opt out, alleging that the 
Interinstitutional Agreement undermined its powers or that it provided for insufficient resources: 
however, its opposition did not last long and compliance with the Interinstitutional Agreement has 
continued to be its dominant strategy also during the annual budgetary procedure11. The main 
reasons that could account for the Parliament’s compliance are its inability to radically change a 
decision taken by member States at unanimity and the loss of reputation and of mutual reliance that 
non-compliance would entail in its repeated interactions with the Council. As a matter of fact, the 
Parliament’s threats to opt out12 aimed substantially at extracting concessions on the annual 
                                                          
10 The Commission is not the agenda-setter, as the European Council acts as a sovereign body and can radically change 
its draft. However, the Commission can decisively orientate the decision, by preparing focal points for discussion and 
bargaining and, until the last renewal of the Financial Perspectives when this role was taken by the Presidency, by acting 
as a mediator.  
11 The Parliament has estimated that, had it used the Maximum Rate of Increase of the non-compulsory expenditures, it 
could have increased the budget by nearly EUR 33 billion over the 2000-2004 period (European Parliament 2004a): 
however, compliance with the Interinstitutional Agreement never failed in those years. 
12 The voluntary nature of the agreement and the veto power of the Parliament on it were restated on the occasion of the 
Commission’s Communication presenting the 2007-2013 Financial Perspectives. The Parliament “recalls that there will 
be no financial perspective without an agreement between the Parliament and the Council on the financial package, as 
the existing Treaty foresees no obligation to have a financial perspective and only provides for annual budgets” 
(European Parliament, 2004a, p.6). 
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budgetary discipline (opinion exchanges on the financial priorities, concert on compulsory 
expenditures): the Parliament was ready to offer the Council “budget peace in exchange for political 
territory” (European Parliament, 1993). On the other hand, the Council proved to be more 
accommodating to the requests for institution building than to the requests for increases in the 
expenditure lines13.   
The institutional role of the Parliament was consolidated also by informal institution-
building, namely by the emergence of stricter and more timely budgetary cooperation: “[Budgetary 
conflicts] had put to the forefront the fact that the procedures established in the Treaty were too 
rigid to consolidate a political dialogue and that this latter had to be built in more informal 
meetings” (Bangemann, 1979, p. 177 – own translation). Since 1975 the Council had taken the habit 
to receive a delegation from the Parliament before its first and second reading: this first negotiation 
forum evolved into the current four trialogues and two conciliation meetings14 that are not regulated 
by the Treaty, but that have tuned the budgetary procedure according to joint decision-making 
modes. The Parliament obtained that these modes were given first official recognition in the 1993 
Interinstitutional Agreement.  
These habits of cooperation outside the formal procedure are sustained by repetition and 
trust and have made less relevant the precise assignment of competences and the distinction between 
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditures. As a consequence, the Council has slowly and with 
considerable reservation come to terms with the presence of the Parliament in this policy field 
(Laffan, 1997, p. 89) and the Parliament has gradually, although informally, extended its political 
competence over the whole budget (Enderlein et al. 2005). We conclude on the relevance of 
informal institutions (Goodin, 2000; Farrell-Héritier, 2003), showing in detail how the particular 
formal setting chosen in the Treaty invited their emergence to avoid deadlock situations. 
Table 4 shows how allocation-insistent strategies were still employed during the 1994 annual 
procedure, which was disciplined by the Interinstitutional Agreement and supported by extensive 
communication between the actors. Controversies on the expenditure classification and allocation 
insistent strategies still persisted but did not escalate into open conflict, as the main difficulties 
could be already settled in political negotiations. Informal institutions and predetermined ceilings on 
                                                          
13 According to Lindner (2006) this can be ascribed to the different time horizons of the institutions. The Parliament 
pursues a long-term strategy of institutional contestation against the Council which is more interested in short-term 
distributive outcomes. The difference in time horizons allows for a compromise that grants the Council distributive 
gains and the Parliament some institutional advantages.  
14 Trialogues are attended by the Chairman of the Committee on Budgets in the Parliament, the President of the Council 
(Budgets) and the Commissioner for the budget: their aim is to settle contentious issues at the first stages of the 
procedure. Conciliation meetings debate spending priorities and are attended by the members of Council (Budgets) and 
a Parliament’s delegation, while the Commission acts as mediator. 
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expenditure thus provided for smooth working of the procedure, although each budgetary authority 
retained the final word on its own share of expenditure. 
The informal institutions and the Interinstitutional Agreement have thus granted stability to 
the decision-making system and have consolidated the institutional role of the Parliament. However, 
by mitigating the institutional hardships, they have contributed to postponing more far-reaching 
reforms, namely granting the Parliament access to the core of the common pool problem .  
The budgetary procedure, its problems and solutions have marked the subsequent 
involvement of the Parliament in the EU decision-making processes. In particular, codecision also 
presents an alternating offers bargaining, which is all the more interesting as it as been adopted for 
the new budgetary procedure in the 2007 Reform Treaty.   
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – The procedure for the adoption of the 1995 budget 
 
Stages of the 
procedure 
Strategies of the Parliament and  the Council (art. 272 EC Treaty) 
 Interinstitutional trialogue on priorities and two conciliation meetings on CE 
 
 
Commission 
preliminary draft  
 
The draft budget presents a total increase of 4%, substantial margins under the headings for 
internal policies, external actions and administration, expenditure increases only for structural 
actions: X0. 
 Conciliation meeting 
 
1st reading in the 
Council 
The Council cuts the Commission proposal, except for the agricultural and cohesion policies:  
XCE 1  +  XNCE 1        
 
1st reading in the 
Parliament  
The Parliament’s counter-proposal: the Parliament restores most of the Commission proposals; it 
enters reserves for the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden: XCE 2  +  XNCE 2        
 
 Conciliation meeting 
 
2nd reading of the 
Council                    
The Council reinstates its first offer: the Council opposed all modifications to CE (this is the final 
decision on CE, XCE 1 ), rejects the classification of some NCE and accepts only six out of the 
Parliament’s 400 amendments to NCE:  XNCE 3       . 
 
2nd reading of 
Parliament 
The Parliament restores the cuts made by the Council on NCE:  the budget is approved: XCE 1  +  
XNCE 2          
  
 
Source: Lindner (2006), Laffan (1997), European Parliament (1996). 
Legenda. MRI/NCE: Maximum Rate of Increase. NCE: Non-compulsory expenditures ; CE: compulsory expenditures 
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5. Formal and informal working of legislative codecision  
Codecision15 is currently the ordinary legislative decision-making procedure: it was first 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (ex art. 189B TEC) and revised by the Amsterdam Treaty (Art. 
251 TEC). Offers and counter-offers, that modify the original draft submitted by the Commission, 
alternate during two readings. However, if the Council in its second reading disagrees with even a 
single amendment made by the Parliament, the draft is referred to a Conciliation Committee, 
composed of an equal number (currently 27) of members of the Parliament and of the Council. The 
Committee is co-chaired by the Minister holding the Council’s Presidency and by a Parliament’s 
vice-president, while the Commission acts as a mediator. If the Committee reaches an agreement, its 
proposal has to be finally approved by the Parliament (by majority voting) and by the Council (by 
qualified majority voting). In case the Conciliation Committee fails to an agreement, the bill is 
definitely rejected. Figure 2 presents a simplified extensive form version of the legislative process, 
in both Maastricht and Amsterdam versions, that highlights some interesting features: 
i. There is no strict assignment of competencies as in the budgetary procedure, but a 3-
stage alternating offers bargaining, with the Parliament making a first offer to the Council.  
ii. The Treaty does not specify the actual process of negotiation within the Conciliation 
Committee, whose outcome is the determinant of any codecision agreement if all players act 
strategically (Shackelton, 2000; Napel and Widgrén 2006)16.  
iii. The Commission can modify its original proposal at every stage of the procedure 
until the Conciliation Committee is convened and plays a formal ‘gate-keeping’ role 
(Rasmussen, 2003), as the Council can include amendments of the Parliament by qualified 
majority, if they are approved by the Commission, while it need unanimity, if the Commission 
rejected them. However, the Commission cannot directly control the procedure, in the sense 
that it cannot persuade the legislators to adopt its own proposals: its main influence is exerted 
on the tabling and adoption of amendments and compromise texts (Rasmussen, 2003) 17.  
                                                          
15 Codecision has been extensively studied by rational choice institutionalists, who analyze the distribution of power and 
the strategic interactions among actors, often employing spatial modelling: among others, Napel and Widgrén (2003 and 
2006), Crombez (1997 and 2000), Tsebelis (1994 and 2002), Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), Steunenberg and Dimitrova 
(1999), Selck (2006). A different perspective is provided in empirical accounts with detailed case studies:  Shackleton 
(2000), Corbett (2000 and 2001), Corbett et al. (2003a and 2003b), Burns (2002 and 2003), Rasmussen (2003). 
16 The bargaining inside the Conciliation Committee has been modeled in different ways in the literature: as a bilateral 
bargaining (Napel and Widgrén 2003), as an ultimatum game, with either the Council (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 
1999) or the Parliament (Crombez 2000) making the take-it-or-leave-it proposal, and as a  symmetric alternating offers 
bargaining with multiple rounds (Napel and Widgrén 2003 and 2006). Selck (2006) provides for an empirical test of 
some of these models. 
17The literature is divided on the relevance of the Commission’s role in codecision. Rational choice institutionalists 
deem that the poor formal powers assigned to it make it irrelevant (Crombez, 2001; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001); some 
pratictioners also deem that the consolidation of the relationships between Parliament and Council in conciliation has 
excluded the Commission from effective decision-making (Shackleton, 2000). On the contrary, Burns (2002, and 2003) 
and Rasmussen (2003) state that the Commission’s weakness is overstated and empirically analyse the channels through 
which the Commission has formally and informally influenced legislation in codecision. 
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iv. As the number of rounds and the player who makes the last offer within the 
Conciliation Committee are not specified, it seems reasonable to consider the infinite-horizon 
version of the game. Rubinstein’s (1982) result grants a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, 
which depends on the cost-of-time formulas and on the preference specification. Thus, in 
equilibrium, the game should end at the first round. 
v. The opting-out clause is asymmetrically distributed: to the Parliament at its second 
reading, to representatives of Council and Parliament in the Conciliation Committee and to 
both Council and Parliament after the Conciliation Committee. The definitive rejection of the 
bill in case the Conciliation Committee does not reach an agreement is intended as an 
incentive to parties to trade positions in negotiations. From 1994 to April 2004, the Parliament 
opted out in 5 out of the 649 completed dossiers (0,8 percent): thus, the probability that the 
bargaining ends in a state of complete disagreement is very low and it does not seem to 
influence the equilibrium of the game. When the Parliament foresees complete disagreement 
with the Council, it usually prefers to withdraw the dossier before the Council adopts its 
common position in the first reading (10,6 percent of the dossiers in the period 1994-2004). 
 
Like the budgetary process, this formal framework had to be filled with practice (Farrell and 
Héritier, 2003) and legislative codecision met the initial opposition of the Council to a real sharing 
of power with the Parliament:  
 
“We practically had our common position ready when Parliament finished its first reading. And  it 
was politically too complicated to change this [… ] almost existing political agreement, so nothing of 
Parliament’s agreement was taken on board. And then Parliament reconfirmed most of the amendments in 
2nd reading, and we had most of the amendment in conciliation” (interview with Council Official, quoted 
in Farrell and Héritier 2003, p. 590). 
 
The scarce legislative output of the first years reflects these initial attitudes and shows the 
legislators’ gradual learning of how to effectively overcome interinstitutional difficulties: Graph 1 
shows the gradual increase in the number of dossiers concluded at first (2/3 of all dossiers in 2004-
06) and second readings, before conciliation. The learning process which made codecision more 
viable was enacted by informal institutions: in this sense, codecision has followed the same path of 
the budgetary procedure, amending the non-cooperative bargaining set-up of the Treaty with 
informal institutions and habits of negotiation.  
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Figure 2.  An extensive form game of Maastricht and Amsterdam Codecision (art 251 TEC) 
 
    COMMISSION: draft legislation X0 
 
     
 
                         EP’s opinion: X1                                    1st reading   
                                          
 
                                                              
                                 
                               CM (QMV)                                                    1st reading 
             Yes  No 
                                                                                                                                                                        
           The possibility of adoption    
           at first  reading was               X1 adopted                CM’s Common Position X2          
           introduced by Amsterdam                                            
           Treaty      
 
                    EP                                     2nd reading  
                                          Yes   Opt-out (AM members) 
                              No  
                
                               (AM members) 
                                                                X2 adopted                X3                   No act 
 
             Commission’s opinion  
                
                               CM                              2nd reading            
        
                                                                                  Yes     No (U) 
 
                                                           X3 adopted 
                     (QMV or U is commission’s opinion is negative) 
 
       CONCILIATION COMMITTEE 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
      
 joint text X4                        No agreement 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        CM 
   EP                 CM                                                      ( QMV or U) 
                                  (AM  votes)                             ( QMV)                                               may reintroduce X2 
               
                        Yes                     No               Yes               No                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                  
                 X4  adopted             No act       X4  adopted        No act                                                                          
                                                               EP 
                                                                                                                                           No                   Yes 
 
                                                                                                                         (AM members)                     
                                                                                                                                        No act                  X2 adopted                             
 
   
             Abolished by Amsterdam Treaty: currently, in absence 
        of agreement, the act is definitely rejected 
 
Legenda. CM: Council of Ministers; EP: European Parliament;  Xi  : draft proposed at stage i.  
Voting rules: QMV, qualified majority voting; AM, absolute majority; U, unanimity. 
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Graph 1 - Codecision dossiers: 1994-2006 
 
 
Source: European Parliament (2000) and (2004b) and European Parliament website. 
 
 
 
 
 
The formal bargaining has been gradually supported by best practices and informal 
negotiation, in particular trialogue meetings, which have developed a continuous interinstitutional 
dialogue. Trialogues prepare, and sometimes avoid conciliation, as negotiations take place within a 
smaller group of officials and representatives and they help both parties to develop strategies not 
only of persuasion but also of compromise on a third position. On the contrary, the Conciliation 
Committee still keeps its character of non-cooperative bargaining, with only very rare exchanges of 
views (European Parliament, 2004b). Whether the development of informal institutions leads to a 
larger scope for the Commission to act in the legislative process is a debated issue: Tsebelis and 
Garrett (2000) argue that the Commission’s influence is likely to rely more on informal channels, 
due to the poor assignment of formal powers. On the contrary, Schakleton (2000) suggests that the 
consolidation of direct relationships between Parliament and Council has excluded the Commission 
from decision-making and Burns (2002) also point to the reduced role of the Commission as 
informal interlocutor. 
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 The habits of continuous bargaining made possible the development of best practices18, such 
as ‘early’ second reading agreements (15 per cent of all 2004-06 dossiers) concluded after the 
Parliament has adopted its first reading position and before the Council agrees on its common 
position: “While, formally speaking, procedures concluded in this way are concluded at second 
reading stage, in reality a political agreement has already been reached before Council completes its 
first reading” (European Parliament, 2007, p.12).  
  
6. The 2007 Reform Treaty  
The budgetary matters were deeply discussed in the 2002-03 European Convention19. In 
particular, for the budgetary procedure, the Convention suggested the rejection of the distinction 
between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditures and proposed a new budgetary process 
combining joint decision-making and an asymmetric distribution of strategies to the advantage of 
the Parliament: one reading of both authorities plus conciliation, and, in case conciliation fails or if 
the Council rejects the conciliation text, the possibility for the Parliament to have the final say, i.e. 
to confirm its amendments, with no reply for the Council20 (Figure 3). This provisions disrupted the 
alternating offers framework and introduced an incentive for the Parliament first to raise a majority 
in favour of amending the Council’s draft and then to reject both the joint text in conciliation and 
the Council’s position (X1) in order to approve its preferred version (X2). The Inter-governmental 
Conference, which drafted the 2004 Constitution, however, corrected the asymmetry in the 
strategies assignment and reduced the role of the Parliament . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 The standard practices developed between institutions have been the object of two Joint Declarations (1999 and 
2006): practical arrangements are clearly spelled out, widely-used terms are clarified, provisions for greater 
transparency and commitment are detailed. Guidelines for first and second reading agreements were adopted by the 
Conference of the Presidents in November 2004. 
19 For a detailed account of the 2002-04 Constitutional debate, see Benedetto and Hoyland (2007). 
20 This was a reminiscence of Maastricht version of legislative codecision (ex art.189b), with inverted roles for 
Parliament and Council. In Maastricht codecision, the conciliation failure entailed a third reading by the Council which 
could revert to its common position. The Parliament could reject the Council’s position by absolute majority. This 
asymmetry, which favoured the Council, was opposed by the Parliament which committed to veto all Council’s 
common position: in the Amsterdam version of codecision, the failure of conciliation entails the final rejection of the 
bill.  
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Figure 3   
The budgetary procedure in the European Convention’s draft (art. III-310, CONV 850/2003)  
 
                                                                       COMMISSION: draft budget X0 
   
 
     
                                                        CM: X1  (QMV)    
                                                          
 
                                                              
   EP 
                                                       Yes                       No  (M of members) 
 
                                       X2 
                                                    X1  adopted 
                     If CM adopts all EP’s amendments QMV 
 
 
CONCILIATION COMMITTEE                              
EP representatives vote by M of members           X2 adopted                                                     
CM representatives vote by QMV     
       
                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                                                                         
     Agreement: X3    No agreement  
                                            
 
             
      
 Strategies for CM and EP after the Conciliation Committee        
                                                                                                                                           
          
                
           EP  may reintroduce X2                                    
          M members, 3/5 votes                                       
            
            
 
                 X2 adopted     
 
                 
Legenda. CM: Council of Ministers; EP: European Parliament; Xi  : budget proposed at stage i.  
Voting rules: QMV, qualified majority voting; M, majority. 
 
 
The 2007 Lisbon Treaty and the new Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), which incorporates it, substantially confirm the 2004 Constitution with respect to the 
financial issues. The Reform Treaty does not substantially change the Parliament’s access to the 
core of the financial decisions, the Own Resources Decision (art. 311 TFEU) and the Multi-Annual 
Financial Framework (article 312 TFEU), which are strictly kept at intergovernmental level. In both 
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decisions the decision-making power is entrusted to the Council voting at unanimity21 and the also 
monopoly of initiative of the Commission is transferred to the Council. The Parliament is consulted 
in the Own Resources Decision and it is required to express, by a majority of its members, its 
consent to the Council’s proposal on the Multi-Annual Financial Framework. As the 
Interinstitutional Agreement has been eliminated, the say of both the Commission and Parliament on 
the financial programming is reduced: they have no more the possibility to opt-out from subscribing 
a voluntary agreement22 and the Parliament can no longer resort to the Maximum Rate of Increase. 
In case the Parliament does not consent to the Financial Framework presented by the Council, “the 
ceilings and other provisions corresponding to the last year of that framework shall be extended 
until such time as that act is adopted” (art. 312 TFEU). 
The Reform Treaty formally upgrades the Parliament to the role of equal co-legislator in the 
budgetary procedure23, it sanctions the abandonment of the allocation of power according to types 
of expenditure, granting the Parliament competence on the whole budget and modelling the 
procedure according to legislative codecision (art. 314 TFEU). Budgetary codecision replicates 
Amsterdam codecision, but with one reading less before conciliation and a more detailed 
specification of the final stage after the Conciliation Committee (Figure 4).  
The provisions concerning the final approval after conciliation outline a sort of simultaneous 
moves one-shot game, as the joint text of conciliation is submitted en bloc to both budgetary 
institutions. In general, if one or both of them reject the joint text, a new budget proposal will be 
drafted by the Commission. However, if the Parliament approves the conciliation text while the 
Council rejects it, the Parliament can confirm its amendments unconditionally and the Council has 
no veto power: this is a reminiscence of the Convention’s proposal. Assuming complete and perfect 
information, rational behaviour of the players and that the Parliament prefers its own reintroduced 
position or the conciliation text to a new draft24, the dominant strategy for both institutions is always 
to approve the joint text.  
                                                          
21 The 2004 Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty provide for a ‘passerelle’ towards qualified majority voting. However, 
the use of this bridging clause is made difficult by art. IV-144 of the Constitution, granting veto power to national 
Parliaments. 
22 Both the Parliament and the Commission are called to interinstitutional cooperation, which must be applied from the 
start of the procedure in order to ensure its conclusion. To ease the approval of the Financial Framework, Article 270(5) 
of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that “Throughout the procedure leading to the adoption of the financial framework, the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission shall take any measure necessary to facilitate its adoption”. 
23 Doubts are expressed in the literature on the effective powers of the Parliament in codecision. See Napel and Widgrén 
(2003) and (2006). 
24 The actors’ impatience also plays a role in the preference for a new draft. Rittberger (2000) finds that the Parliament 
is more patient than the Council in legislative codecision. The same could be said also for the budgetary process, due to 
the fact the Parliament is less interested in short-term distributive issues than in long-term institutional positions: “as 
long as EU expenditure and pressure from constituencies on MEPs remain low, the Parliament can be assumed to have a 
long time horizon and a strong interest in enhancing its institutional powers in the decision-making power” (Lindner, 
2006, p.31). However, in some instances (the 1987 budget), the Parliament conditioned its position on the budget to 
more important upcoming negotiations on the future EU financing and avoided displeasing the Council with rejection. 
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Figure 4.  The budgetary procedure in the 2007 Reform Treaty (art. 314 TFEU) 
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                       (10 days – QMV)  
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Legenda. CM: Council of Ministers; EP: European Parliament; Xi  : budget proposed at stage i.  
Voting rules: QMV, qualified majority voting; M, majority. 
 
 
This result entails some consequences. First, asymmetrically assigning the Parliament the 
possibility to disregard the joint text rejection by the Council and to reinstate its previous 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Besides, the Parliament’s impatience is increased by the risk to new policies that follows from the absence of the budget 
and from the Commission enacting the provisional twelfths system. 
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amendments after conciliation does not correspond to a real veto power, but is simply functional to 
guarantee that the text approved in conciliation by the delegates of the Parliament and Council is not 
repudiated by their parent bodies. Therefore, the Parliament’s enthusiasm for this provision should 
be dampened, as it does not sanction the “Parliament’s dominant position” in the budget (European 
Parliament, 2008)25.  
Besides, the dominance of the approval strategy after Conciliation, makes essential that the 
Parliament’s delegation in Conciliation be as representative as possible and enjoy the broadest 
support in plenary. Among other things, this implies that the delegations should include members of 
the Committee on Budget and also of other parliamentary committees responsible for issues with 
significant financial impact (as suggested also in European Parliament, 2008).  
Finally, like in the current procedure, opting-out, when possible, does not end the procedure, 
but prolongs it, because the Commission is required to submit a new draft and to begin a new 
process. Given that, under the above mentioned hypotheses, after conciliation the Parliament’s 
dominant strategy is to always approve the joint text, the possibility of asking the Commission for a 
new draft is left to both delegations in the Conciliation Committee. The delegations have, however, 
different voting rules to approve the joint text: qualified majority voting for the Council 
representatives and majority voting for the Parliament’s representatives. The possibility to opt-out, 
i.e. to find a blocking minority in conciliation, is thus easier for the Council than for the Parliament.  
Some other provisions of the Reform Treaty modify the balance of interinstitutional powers. 
In particular, the enlargement of the competences of the European Parliament formalises what is 
currently its political say on compulsory expenditures in informal negotiations, but it cancels the 
formal provisions of the Treaty, that currently entrust the Parliament the final say on non-
compulsory expenditures and the possibility to cut compulsory expenditures, whenever backed by a 
blocking minority in the Council. Under the reformed procedure, the Council formalises its current 
informal say on non-compulsory expenditures, but it loses the power to autonomously raise the 
compulsory expenditures. On balance, the Council seems to gain under the new provisions (see also 
Benedetto and Hoyland, 2007), all the more if we take also into account that the core of the 
expenditure decisions is entrusted to the Multi-annual Financial Framework, where the Council is 
the agenda-setter.  
The enlargement of competences impinges also on the regime in the event that the budget 
cannot be definitively adopted before the beginning of the financial year. The Reform Treaty retains 
the system of the provisional twelfths (art. 315 TFEU). The Parliament loses the power to increase 
                                                          
25 Commenting the new procedure, the Committee on Budget enthusiastically states: “The suggestion that Parliament 
would gain a dominant position in the new budget procedure is confirmed. No annual budget may be adopted without 
the EP’s agreement, but the EP may approve a budget against the wishes of – or in the absence of an opinion from – the 
Council” (European Parliament, 2008a, p.9).   
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the current non-compulsory expenditures and gains the power to reduce the current compulsory 
expenditures.  
In the Reform Treaty, the Commission is given the same power it enjoys in legislative 
decision-making. It prepares not more ‘a preliminary draft’ but ‘the draft budget’, which is more 
than a formal change: in the line of Burns (2003) we believe that this implies more agenda-setting 
power for the Commission, as it is much harder for the budgetary authorities to modify the draft, 
once it has been formally published. Besides, the Commission can amend its own proposal until the 
Conciliation Committee is convened, which facilitates its role as a mediator between the Parliament 
and the Council. Its role is strengthened also in the Conciliation Committee and in the informal 
institutions (art. 324 TFEU). This should provide the Commission the opportunity to better exert its 
influence in formal and informal negotiations and it should avoid that the Commission’s scope to 
act be reduced by the budgetary authorities’ willingness to avoid mediators and to talk to each other 
directly.  
The role of informal institutions is going to be enhanced by the Reform Treaty procedure. 
Budgetary codecision is shorter than the legislative process and the importance of the first readings 
is increased: this implies that there are fewer possibilities for amendments and that amendments 
adopted at first reading will not be corrected by one single authority alone, but will be examined in 
conciliation by both authorities. This shorter process will make essential, in advance of the first 
reading, to clearly state the political priorities of each institution and to reinforce the mechanisms of 
informal infra-institutional and interinstitutional dialogue at an early stage, so that conciliation can 
be adequately prepared. As in legislative codecision, the need of trialogues and informal contacts at 
early stages creates new agenda-setting power for the Parliament and enhances its bargaining 
position. 
The role of the current trialogues, and consequently the limits of the formal alternating-offers 
procedural design, are explicitly recognized by the Reform Treaty (art. 324 TFEU). Budgetary 
trialogues are convened on the initiative of the Commission, whose role as a mediator is reinforced. 
Besides,  the Presidents of the budgetary authorities are encouraged to take all the necessary steps to 
promote consultation and the reconciliation of the positions. This provision reinforces the general 
duty of sincere cooperation between the institutions by creating what is practically an obligation for 
the institutions to consult one another (European Parliament, 2008a). The explicit recognition of the 
role of informal institutions is evidence of an ‘iterated process of constitutional change’ (Farrell and 
Héritier, 2003), in which the new provisions are the product of previous informal rule-making. 
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Informal institutions are therefore called to intensively assist the working of the new 
budgetary procedure. Their mitigating role should however be counted among the reasons26 that 
have prevented a more thorough institutional budgetary reform: along the years, they have 
accommodated much of the pressure for change, by granting an escape to the strict non-cooperative 
setting designed by the Treaty. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Legislative codecision and the current budgetary procedure are generally given different 
appreciation: while codecision is generally praised as efficient, the budgetary procedure is normally 
disregarded as obsolete and complicated. However, they share a common root: they both are 
designed as alternating offers bargaining games, which is the peculiar way chosen in the EU to 
reconcile national sovereignty and supranational authority. Early in their application, both 
procedures caused interinstitutional difficulties, misunderstandings and deadlocks. Explanations for 
this are provided by a consolidated literature, but an inbuilt reason lies also in the non-cooperative 
nature of the bargaining games, that exasperates the interinstitutional tensions, and in the difficulty 
that institutions have in applying the alternating offers setup: it can be politically too complicated 
for institutions to change their internal agreements on a draft in order to accept the counterpart’s 
amendments.  
Part of  the solution to the above procedural problems has come from the mitigating role of 
early and continuous negotiation entrusted to informal institutions, as argued also by Goodin (2000), 
Farrell and Héritier (2003) and Shackleton (2000). By means of informal negotiation, the Parliament 
and the Council have been able to change the decision-making process from the non-cooperative 
alternating offers bargaining prescribed by the Treaty into cooperation and the search for 
compromise. Informal institutions have played, however, an ambiguous role: although they could 
circumvent the difficulties of decision-making, they also provided an escape to more radical 
changes in the assignment of institutional roles and have delayed reforms. The budgetary procedure 
has certainly benefited from the presence of trialogues and conciliation meetings: however, they 
have diluted the spur to a deeper involvement of the Parliament in the core of the budgetary 
decisions.  
The 2007 Reform Treaty does not change much the current combination of national 
sovereignty and supranational authority in the decision-making process. It does not substantially 
                                                          
26 Benedetto and Hoyland (2007) argue that the substantial maintenance of the status quo in the reformed budgetary 
process, is due to the fact that the Parliament gains in constitutional forms where it is a formal actor and unanimity is not 
required (the Convention), while it loses in a closed forum (the IGC) where it only attends the meeting and the voting 
rule is unanimity. Enderlein and Lindner (2006) argue that the present state of political integration has prevented the 
more radical changes of the decision-making processes for the EU finances. 
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change the Parliament’s access to the core of the financial decisions, the Own Resources Decision 
and the Multi-Annual Financial Framework, which are strictly kept at intergovernmental level. The 
adoption of codecision for the budget and the formal upgrading of the Parliament to the role of 
equal co-legislator amount to the “consolidation of the rules which have been necessitated by 
practical constraints outside the Treaty machinery”, as the European Convention had suggested 
(European Convention, 2003, p.12). In particular, the role of informal institutions is formalized, thus 
explicitly recognizing their mitigating influence in the too strict design of the procedure. They will 
be all the more important, as the new procedure is shorter and thus requires trialogues and informal 
contacts at an early stage: this will be an opportunity fro the Parliament to creating new occasions to 
increase its influence in the agenda-setting. 
Some shifts in the balance of powers occurs with the new procedure. The Commission gains 
some scope for action, as it is recognized a formal role in negotiations and during the readings. The 
Council gains from the enlargement of competences on the expenditures and from the possibility to 
opt-out in conciliation more easily than the Parliament. The Parliament is not given a formal 
dominant position, as the provision that assigns it the possibility to disregard the joint text rejection 
by the Council and to reinstate its previous amendments after conciliation is simply functional to 
guarantee that the text approved in conciliation by the delegates of the Parliament and Council is not 
repudiated by their parent bodies.  
The assignment of powers in the decision-making processes for the EU finances mirrors the 
present state of political integration, as Enderlein and Lindner (2006) suggest. This is not the end of 
the story, but it is the starting point for new interactions between the budgetary authorities, which 
obey not only a  formal procedural design, but also those informal rules of decision-making, which, 
since the first budgetary procedure in 1970-75, have blurred and modified the original formal 
outline. To the working of the current trialogues and of new informal spaces for negotiations is 
entrusted the possibility for the Commission and the Parliament to build intensive interinstitutional 
dialogue with the Council and stronger bargaining positions. As in the past, this will probably be, in 
the future, the basis for redefining relationships among institutions. 
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